Questão nos debates da doutrina e da jurisprudência, este livro trata da distinção entre princípios e regras. Para tanto, esmiúça os conceitos e os aspectos da garantia de sua aplicação e de sua efetividade.

Instead of the usual apologetic treatment found in legal doctrine, linked to the determinacy, immutability or predictability of norms, this book treats legal certainty innovatively, holistically and in depth. Using a method at once analytical and functional, Professor Ávila examines the structural elements of legal certainty, from its definition and foundations to its various dimensions, normative forces and efficacies, citing a wealth of examples from case law to support each of the theses defended. No subject is more important and topical (...) than legal certainty. Problems relating to lack of understanding, instability and unpredictability of law intensify day by day everywhere, in civil law and common law countries alike. Normative sources are increasingly diverse in origin and multiple in nature. They change constantly, and present increasingly frequent problems of ambiguity and vagueness that significantly hinder their comprehension. This state of affairs, which to a greater or lesser extent is true of any legal order, justifies a return to the subject of legal certainty. In this book, essential questions are answered such as: Legal certainty in what sense? Certainty of what, for whom, in whose vision and by whom? When, to what extent, and to what end? “ it is probably the most comprehensive and systematic study ever produced on this subject using the analytical method.”. (shrink)

The work of Anthony J. Steinbock on emotions―particularly moral emotions―and on religious experience is closely related to a methodological claim. This claim is that the concepts of “experience” and “manifestation” should be understood in a broader manner than that of classical phenomenology, particularly Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. In this paper, I examine the way in which Steinbock understands and conceptualizes the kind of givenness to which he refers with the notion of “vertical experience”. I focus on his claim that vertical experiences (...) are irreducible to the kind of experiences that can be described in terms of what he calls “provocation”, “presentation” and the “noesis-noema structure”. Even though I make a criticism of his assertion that the latter implies that they should not be understood as forms of givenness founded on the above-mentioned structure, I agree with some major implications that he draws from them. In the last part of the paper, I discuss his suggestion that the Husserlian conceptualization of emotional givenness should be revised to set forward their structure in terms of what he calls “evocation” and try to give additional reasons, drawn from Husserl himself, to support this claim. The paper comes concludes by stressing the relevance of Steinbock’s analyses concerning what he calls “idolatry”. I argue that his analyses of attitudes that negate the vertical dimension of experience have far reaching implications that go beyond the field of philosophy of religion and open new, promising paths for phenomenological research on social and moral problems. (shrink)

The question I consider is this: -/- The Question: Can two people–who are, and realize they are, intellectually virtuous to about the same degree–both be rational in continuing knowingly to disagree after full disclosure (by each to the other of all the relevant evidence they can think of) while at the same time thinking that the other may well be rational too? -/- I distinguish two kinds of rationality–internal and external–and argue in section 1 that, whichever kind we have in (...) mind, the answer to The Question is ‘yes’ (though that positive answer is less wholehearted in the case of external rationality). Then, in section 2, I briefly make some more general remarks about when discovering a disagreement provides a defeater and when it doesn't. In the final section, I consider an important objection to the answer given in section 1 to The Question. (shrink)

La disolución del poder colonial en la América española creó una serie de interrogantes respecto al ordenamiento jurídico-político de los futuros estados soberanos. En este sentido, Simón Bolívar (1783–1830) insistió en la idea de que el control político de los territorios liberados por él debía estar al mando de un poder central conservador capaz de garantizar los derechos ciudadanos sin menoscabo de la estabilidad sociopolítica del orden republicano. Aunque algunos aspectos del ideario constitucional bolivariano resultaron inaceptables para sus contemporáneos, sus (...) medidas para asegurar el goce de los derechos civiles y políticos de los americanos se ajustaban a la realidad social de su tiempo. Con base en una amplia consulta bibliográfica, el presente artículo examina la concepción bolivariana del cuerpo político a la luz de las circunstancias sociohistóricas a las que el Libertador debió hacer frente. (shrink)

La lección de Weber sobre la democracia es doble. Por un lado, la precisión acerca de qut actores y qut procesos son claves en su estudio -lidera, burocracia, partidos, búsqueda del poder, responsabilidad, &c.- y, por otro, la convicción acerca de los limites de lo posible en una democracia. P..

En el presente trabajo se propone un estudio comparativo de las producciones de algunos referentes de la Investigación Participativa. Se revisan algunos de los textos de Orlando Fals Borda, Paulo Freire, João Bosco Guedes Pinto, Michel Thiollent, María Teresa Sirvent y Joel Martí. Este trabajo se inscribe en el proceso reciente de transformación universitaria en Uruguay, en particular, en una de sus iniciativas: la de la integración curricular de la extensión a través de lo que se ha denominado “prácticas universitarias (...) integrales”. En este marco, la reflexión teórico-metodológica sobre la extensión crítica y las prácticas de investigación-acción conectadas con ella resultan fundamentales para dotar las iniciativas en curso de mayor pertinencia académica y potencial transformador. (shrink)

"Knowing how we know" is the subject of this book. Its authors present a new view of cognition that has important social and ethical implications, for, they assert, the only world we humans can have is the one we create together through the actions of our coexistence. Written for a general audience as well as for students, scholars, and scientists and abundantly illustrated with examples from biology, linguistics, and new social and cultural phenomena, this revised edition includes a new afterword (...) by Dr. Varela, in which he discusses the effect the book has had in the years since its first publication. (shrink)

RESUMEN Se analiza la relación entre las memorias inscritas en el cuerpo, el trauma y los recursos corporizados subjetivos y colectivos con los que cuentan las mujeres víctimas de violencia para reconstruir y resignificarse como personas dignas de credibilidad y agentes de cambio. Se refieren casos específicos de violencia sexual en Colombia y se expone la importancia de la creación de comunidades de confianza que propicien espaclos para la narración y escucha de los testimonlos de víctimas, la tramitación de conflictos (...) y nuevas vías de afrontamiento, a partir de los recursos que brinda la reinvención de hábitos corporizados en el arte. ABSTRACT The article analyzes the relation among memories inscribed in the body, trauma, and the subjective and collective embodied resources available to women victims of violence in order to reconstruct and resignify themselves as persons worthy of credibility and as agents of change. It discusses specific cases of sexual violence in Colombia and the importance of creating communities of trust that foster spaces for narrating and listening to the testimonies of victims, as well as for handling conflicts and exploring new ways of coping, on the basis of the resources provided by the reinvention of habits embodied in art. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Purpose of Hegel's System FRITHJOF H. BERGMANN THIS ESSAYIS MEANTtO answer the question: what was Hegel really trying to do; what was the program that his system attempted to execute; what was the general enterprise that his philosophy sought to perform? Two things are clear: (1) Hegel insisted that philosophy had to be systematic. He ridiculed philosophers who made disconnected assertions and accused them of "shallowness" and (...) of "inspirationalism." The systematic exposition of philosophy was for Hegel synonymous with doing philosophy scientifically. If a proposition was not presented in the context of a philosophic system, it could not be more than a bald and unsupported assertion that did not merit serious philosophical consideration? (2) Hegel claimed that his own system demonstrated the "necessity" of its contents. The majority of the German Hegel scholars, Haym, Haering, Fischer, Rosenzweig, and Glockner, for example, never attempted to arrive at a precise explication of the function of Hegel's system or of his concept of necessity. They were interested in altogether different questions. The Englishspeaking scholars are generally agreed that by "necessity" Hegel meant "deductive certainty" or something very akin to it and that his system was therefore intended to demonstrate the indubitability, the certainty, or the a priority, of the propositions it contains. The deductions of Hegel's system were, according to them, designed to guarantee the factual truth of the statements derived. The general function of the system was to eliminate doubt. Stace, for example, defends this interpretation in his well-known book The Philosophy of Hegel. 2 In fact, he regards this claim to deductive certainty as the "cardinal claim" of Hegel's philosophy and extends it furthermore beyond the limits of Hegel's system so that, according to him, every possible true proposition can be established with logical necessity. Stace says: If we could discover a first principle, and could prove that it followed by logical necessity from that first principle that there must be a world and that it must be just the sort of world it is, then we should have an explanation.... Thus a philosophy which would genuinely explain the world will take as its first principle not a cause but a reason. From this first reason it will proceed to deduce the world, not as an effect, but as a logical consequent. We shall then see not merely that things are as they are, but we shall see why xCf. Preface to the Phenomenology. W. T. Stace, The Philosophy of Hegel (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1955). [189] 190 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY they are as they are. This is the fundamental Hegelian idea of explanation. This is what tIegel's philosophy attempts to do? Later in the book Stace examines the "extraordinary position" which Hegel "takes up" on the question of the "contingency of nature." Hegel, as Stace points out, believed that particular facts and things cannot be deduced, that the "details of nature.., are governed by contingency and caprice." This position, according to Stace, "will not bear examination." Stace ascribes to tIegel the premise that "there is in this stone, or this man, nothing but thought, nothing but universals," and it, in Stace's opinion, implies that everything can be deduced. "If we are to have an idealistic monism it must explain everything from its single first principle, thought. And that means that it must deduce everything. To leave anything outside the network of deduction, to declare anything utterly undeducible, is simply dualism." * To answer this interpretation thoroughly, the character and purpose of Hegel's system has to be explained. This we shall attempt in the remainder of this essay. But three points can be made in a preliminary way: 1) Is the position which Hegel did not hold, but which he should have held, according to Stace, any more tenable than the position which Stace rejects as inconsistent? Is it really conceivable that every last fact concerning tile universe--including the number of hairs on Hegel's head--could be "logically deduced" from a first principle? 2) Did Hegel really accept the premise which in Stace's opinion implies that every fact must be deducible? This would certainly be important, since Ilegel... (shrink)

Adherents of traditional western Theism have espoused CONJUNCTION: God is essentially perfectly good and God is thankworthy for the good acts he performs. But suppose that (i) God’s essential perfect goodness prevents his good acts from being free, and that (ii) God is not thankworthy for an act that wasn’t freely performed. Together these entail the denial of CONJUNCTION. The most natural strategy for defenders of CONJUNCTION is to deny (i). We develop an argument for (i), and then identify two (...) ways for the defender of CONJUNCTION to respond. Next we turn to a considerably different, rather less obvious route toward defending CONJUNCTION that is compatible with (i)—one which instead denies (ii). Here too we identify two ways for the defender of CONJUNCTION to proceed, yielding a total of four ways for the theist to respond. Because the last of these represents an important and underappreciated alternative for the theist, we devote the second half of the paper to developing and defending it. We argue that divine responsibility is sufficient for divine thankworthiness and consistent with the absence of divine freedom. We do this while insisting on the view that both freedom and responsibility are incompatible with causal determinism. (shrink)

This work will examine the main issues generated in the discussion about social justice, freedom and equality from a Marxist and egalitarian liberalism perspective, which would require an answer if the search for a good society continues. Since the world’s economic, social, political and cultural situation has changed in the last decades, nowadays the necessary ethic-political foundations for a fair and free social order must be discussed. The problem is to clarify, in the light of political philosophy and human sciences, (...) the proposals made about such social order and for the current moment, and from the socialist and egalitarian liberal theories with thinkers such as Marx, Cohen and Roemer, for the first, and Rawls, Dworkin Nagel and Sen, for the second, among others. The purpose of this work is mainly didactic and deals with a description of situations such as poverty, exclusion and social inequality that the world lives in. It also deals with the authors’ proposals about such topics, analyzing if there is incompatibility between the capitalist institutions and the socialist project for the achievement of these ideals/values that give origin to the title. (shrink)

A pesar de los importantes cuestionamientos que han sido realizados a la “Teoría” de la Transición Demográfica, ésta continúa representando el marco interpretativo más usualmente utilizado por los investigadores de la temática poblacional, los cuales tratan de enriquecerla con lo “observado” en diferentes contextos, buscando las regularidades de las problemáticas poblacionales manifestadas en los mismos con lo acontecido en otras regiones, generalmente de países desarrollados. En tal sentido en el presente artículo se analizan aspectos demográficos o sociales poco explorados, en (...) el marco de dicha teoría, que no obstante, pueden haber tenido un peso importante en la explicación de los cambios poblacionales tales como la sexualidad y la nupcialidad y asociado a ello el comportamiento reproductivo de las mujeres así como las relaciones de violencia en el marco de la familia y la afectación de todo ello a grupos vulnerables como son los jóvenes. El interés de análisis se centra en los aspectos referidos, considerando como contexto espacial a los estados limítrofes con los Estados Unidos, en los que los indicadores sociodemográficos sugieren un relativamente avanzado proceso de transición demográfica, lo que pudiera estar vinculado a la influencia norteamericana, escenario que es complejizado por una intensa corriente migratoria desde otras partes del país hacia la región del norte de México. (shrink)

Una revisión somera de la teorí­a contemporánea de la democracia ofrece el siguiente panorama: por un lado, una valoración positiva de la forma efectiva de la democracia, es decir, la democracia liberal y representativa porque provee estabilidad, se respetan las libertades y tienen altos niveles de legitimidad; y, por el otro, una crí­tica de la democracia por ineficiente, representativa y no participativa y por liberal en oposición a social. El problema, evidentemente, es el siguiente: la democracia, ¿podrí­a ser como deberí­a (...) ser o sólo puede ser como de hecho es? Evidentemente, no se puede ofrecer a esta pregunta una respuesta definitiva y, en su lugar, se revisan los argumentos de aquellos autores que defienden a la democracia liberal y representativa como la única forma de gobierno posible en el mundo moderno con la intención de determinar si tienen o no razón, es decir, si la democracia representativa y liberal es, en efecto, la única forma de democracia posible. Dos ejemplos clásicos de esta tesis se encuentran en las obras de Publius y Alexis de Tocqueville."œThe conditions of a possible democracy: The Federalist and Tocqueville"A superficial review of the contemporary theory of democracy ofers the following panorama. On the one hand, a positive appraisal of the efective form of democracy, that is, liberal and representative democracy because it provides stability, freedom is respected and there are high levels of justice. On the other, a criticism of democracy for being ineficient, representative and non-participatory, and for being liberal in opposition to social. Obviously the problem is the following: could democracy be what it should be or can it only be de facto? Obviously a definite answer cannot be given to this question and, instead, the arguments of those authors who defend liberal and representative democracy as the only possible form of government in the modern world are revised with the intention of determining whether they are right or not, that is, if representative and liberal government is, in efect, the only form of possible government. Two classic examples of this thesis are found in the works of Publius and Alexis de Tocqueville. (shrink)

El presente artículo pretende analizar el método que utiliza Norberto Bobbio para investigar sus objetos de estudio centrales, a saber: el derecho y la política. Se argumenta que el método de investigación propuesto por Bobbio es el de la reconstrucción. Además, se propone que para su despliegue su acude a la delimitación conceptual y la reconstrucción histórica. Un hallazgo importante del artículo muestra que es la perspectiva de la filosofía como concepción del mundo, elaborada por Bobbio, entre los años 40 (...) y 50 del siglo pasado permite la concreción del metido y las herramientas para entender la política y el derecho. Para la filosofía, en tanto concepción del mundo, Bobbio tomará elementos importantes de la tradición de la filosofía analítica, por una parte; por otra parte, de las enseñanzas de algunos filósofos, que, a través de los siglos, se han consolidado como clásicos. La reconstrucción como método de investigación mostrará que los objetos de estudio tales como el derecho y la política se comprenden partiendo de un cuidadoso y riguroso análisis de los conceptos fundamentales que los componen y del examen de las teorías esenciales de los filósofos clásicos del pensamiento occidental en el terreno político y jurídico. Para tratar estos asuntos, el presente artículo se dividirá en las siguientes partes: en un primer momento, se analiza la concepción de filosofía de Bobbio. En segundo lugar, se examina la idea de que la filosofía como método de investigación se debe entender como una dinámica de reconstrucción. Por último, el artículo propone que el desarrollo de la filosofía como método se efectúa a través de la delimitación y el análisis conceptual y a través de la reconstrucción histórica de los clásicos del pensamiento occidental. (shrink)

This article shows the close relationship that exists between two fundamental concepts in the theological doctrine of Origen of Alexandria: “fullness” and“participation”. These two concepts have been the subject of many earlier studies. However, they treated the topic in a more restricted sense, exploring very specific aspects of Origenian theology. The originality of this study lies in demonstrating how both concepts recur frequently in his theological thinking, give it a framework and hold his thought together. They consequently systematize and make (...) possible a perfect synthesis of all his thinking. (shrink)